Abstract. The recent result of Friedgut, Kalai and Nisan [9] gives a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem regarding manipulation in elections, but holds only for neutral social choice functions and three alternatives. We complement their theorem by proving a similar result regarding Pareto-Optimal social choice functions when the number of voters is two. We discuss the implications of our results with respect to the agenda of precluding manipulation in elections by means of computational hardness.
Introduction
Can we design a good voting rule that is immune to manipulation? That is, one in which the best strategy for each voter is to report its true preferences, without taking into account complicated strategic issues ("my first-ranked alternative has no chance of winning, so perhaps I should vote for my second best option")? The classic result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite [10, 16] gives us an unfortunate answer: every voting rule that is immune to manipulation must be dictatorial. The question we ask in this paper is: is there a reasonable voting rule that is mostly immune to manipulation? That is, can we find a voting rule that cannot be manipulated "most" of the time?
Let us discuss this problem more formally. The basic ingredients of a voting setting are a set of voters N , |N | = n, and a set of alternatives A, |A| = m. The preferences of each voter are represented by a ranking of the alternatives, which is the private information of the voter. The collection of the preferences of all the voters is known as a preference profile. The setting also consists of a social choice function (SCF), which is simply a voting rule: a function that receives the preference profile submitted by the voters, and outputs the winning alternative. can improve the outcome of the election with nonnegligible probability by simply reporting a random ranking instead of its truthful ranking.
Roughly speaking, define an SCF f to be δ-dictatorial if one must change the outcome of f on at most a δ-fraction of the preference profiles in order to transform f into a dictatorship. We call f -strategyproof if, given a random profile, a random manipulation succeeds with probability at most . Friedgut et al. suggested that the following quantitative version of the G-S Theorem is true: If |A| ≥ 3, then any -strategyproof SCF that is onto A (and possibly satisfies additional weak properties) is δ-dictatorial, for δ = K 1 ·poly(n, m)· 1/K2 , where K 1 and K 2 are constants. Such a result would directly imply that if a random manipulation succeeds with only negligible probability, namely is superpolynomially small, then the SCF must be very close to being dictatorial, that is unreasonable from a social choice point of view. Hence, if this statement is true, it would be of supreme importance to the frequency-of-manipulation agenda.
Friedgut et al. themselves were only able to prove the above result under the assumptions that there are exactly three alternatives, and that the SCF is neutral, i.e. indifferent to the identities of the alternatives. The techniques of Friedgut et al. are beautiful, but it seems to be very difficult to generalize their proof to more than just 3 alternatives. Strictly speaking, neutrality might also be undesirable, since neutrality and anonymity (indifference to the identities of the voters) are sometimes mutually exclusive [12, page 25] , and all prominent SCFs are anonymous.
Xia and Conitzer [19] extended the result of Friedgut et al. (via a completely different, involved line of reasoning) to any number of alternatives. However, the quality of their result decreases rapidly with the number of alternatives, so the authors assume that the number of alternatives is constant in order to achieve the ideal of Friedgut et al. In addition, Xia and Conitzer require several very technical and restrictive assumptions with respect to the SCF. Although they show that these assumptions are satisfied by most (but not all) prominent SCFs, the assumptions still severely limit the scope of their result when it comes to the possibility of designing nonstandard SCFs that are usually hard to manipulate.
Our result. We complement the two previous results along the line of work proposed by Friedgut et al. by establishing the desired quantitative version of G-S for an arbitrary number of alternatives m but n = 2, namely only two voters. The only assumption we make is that the SCF is Pareto-optimal, i.e., if all voters rank alternative a above b, than b is not elected. Specifically, we prove:
Main Theorem. Let < 1 32m 9 ; assume N = {1, 2}, m ≥ 3, and let f be an -strategyproof and Pareto-optimal SCF. Then f is 16m 8 -dictatorial.
In particular, if the probability of success of a random manipulation is negligible, then f is very close to being dictatorial. As Pareto-Optimality is a very basic requirement, this directly implies that it is impossible to design a reasonable SCF that is frequently hard to manipulate, when each voter votes independently and uniformly at random and N = {1, 2}.
Discussion. A crucial aspect of our theorem is that it seems to be better than previous results as a first step towards a more general result. Indeed, the proof of Friedgut et al. is fascinating but involved and relies on heavy mathematical machinery: Fourier analysis, isoperimetric inequalities, and so on. The proof of Xia and Conitzer seems to strongly rely on their assumptions, and it is not clear if the same techniques can be used once these assumptions are removed.
On the other hand, our proof is relatively simple and is built "from scratch". More importantly, Svensson [17] gives an inductive argument that extends the deterministic proof of G-S from two voters to n voters. However, this argument is not "robust", in the sense that using it directly causes too great a deterioration in the quality of the result with respect to n and m. Certainly, new tricks are needed, but we believe that using clever induction on the number of voters in order to achieve a general result should be possible.
We wish to make some remarks regarding the generality of our result. First, we assume Pareto-optimality, but this assumption can probably be relaxed, since in the deterministic case Pareto-optimality is implied by strategyproofness. Second, our auxilary monotonicity lemma (Lemma 1) can certainly be generalized to any number of voters n.
Let us briefly examine the significance of our result in its own right (and not as a first step towards a general result). The case of two voters and m alternatives might at first seem less important than the case of n voters and three alternatives that was considered by Friedgut et al. This is true in political elections (where one expects to find more voters than candidates), but not in general (and especially not in computer science). For instance, in settings where multiple agents must decide between joint plans or beliefs the number of alternatives is typically far greater than the number of voters. In addition, when the number of alternatives is constant, a potential manipulator can simply check all the possible rankings, so there is no question of computational complexity. The problem becomes more interesting when the number of alternatives is large, as it is in our case.
As a final remark, we wish to address the impartial culture assumption (voters vote independently and uniformly), also used by Friedgut et al. and Xia and Conitzer. Even if one proves the general quantitative version of G-S (as discussed above), it would not necessarily spell the end of the hardness of manipulation agenda. The rankings of voters are typically not independent nor uniform, but centered around specific strong alternatives. So, the underlying assumption that voters vote independently and uniformly at random may not be realistic. However, this assumption allows for elegant "lower bounds", as noted by Friedgut et al. Ultimately, the ideal is to obtain results that also hold under a wide range of typical distributions.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we formally present the necessary notations and definitions. In Section 3, we formulate and prove our main result.
Preliminaries
We deal with a finite set of voters N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a finite set of alternatives A, where |A| = m. We denote alternatives by letters such as a, b, c, x, y.
Each voter i ∈ N holds a strict total order R i over A, i.e. R i is a binary relation over A that satisfies irreflexivity, antisymmetry, transitivity and totality. Informally, R i is a ranking of the alternatives. The set L = L(A) is the set of all such (linear) orders, so for all
We make the Impartial Culture Assumption throughout the paper, that is, we assume that random preference profiles are drawn by independently and uniformly drawing a random ranking for each voter (each possible ranking has a probability of 1/m!). So, for instance, when we write Pr R N [E] we refer to the probability that the event E occurs, when the preferences of each voter R i are independently and uniformly distributed. Furthermore, when we write, e.g., Pr R N ,Q 1 [E], we mean that the preferences R 1 , . . . , R n and Q 1 are all drawn independently at random.
We now define some probabilistic versions of well-known properties of SCFs.
Definition 2. Let f be an SCF. Voter i ∈ N is a δ-dictator with respect to a ∈ A iff Pr
R N [f (R N ) = a | ∀x ∈ A \ {a}, aR i x] ≤ δ.
Voter i is a δ-dictator iff it is a δ-dictator with respect to every a ∈ A. f is a δ-dictatorship if there exists a δ-dictator.
The classical definition of a dictatorship corresponds to the definition of a 0-dictatorship under this formulation. Also note that δ-dictatorship under our definition implies δ-far from dictatorship under the definition of Friedgut et al. [9] . Let us turn to a probabilistic definition of strategyproofness. An SCF f is manipulable at R N ∈ L N if there exists a voter i ∈ N and a ranking
That is, voter i strictly benefits according to its true preferences R i by reporting false preferences Q i . An SCF is strategyproof if it is not manipulable at any R N ∈ L N .
Definition 3. An SCF f is -strategyproof iff for all voters
So, strategyproofness corresponds to 0-strategyproofness accordingto this probabilistic definition. Our definition of -strategyproofness is exactly equivalent to all voters having manipulation power at most according to the definition given by Friedgut et al. [9] .
The classic formulation of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [10, 16] is as follows.
Theorem 1 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite). Assume |A| ≥ 3, and let f : L N → A be a strategyproof SCF that is onto A. Then f is dictatorial.
Finally, we wish to extend the classic definition of monotonicity. Let R ∈ L, a ∈ A, and denote
, and denote
In words, f is γ-monotonic if improving a winning alternative harms it with probability at most γ. Monotonicity is equivalent to 0-monotonicity. We wish to point out that monotonicity is a very strong property, as the order of other alternatives can change as long as the winner only improves with respect to other alternatives. In fact, monotonicity is closely related to, and implied by, strategyproofness.
Main Theorem
Our aim is to prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Theorem 1), under the assumptions that N = {1, 2} and that the SCF in question is Pareto-optimal. Note that Pareto-optimality implies surjectivity, as if all the voters rank x ∈ A first then x must be elected, and this is true for all x ∈ A.
Theorem 2. Let < 1 32m 9 ; assume N = {1, 2}, m ≥ 3, and let f be anstrategyproof and Pareto-optimal SCF. Then f is 16m 8 -dictatorial.
We wish to stress once again that, as in Friedgut et al. [9] and Xia and Conitzer [19] , the underlying assumption is the impartial culture assumption, that is the voters vote independently and uniformly at random. Let us now turn to the proof of Theorem 2. The proof follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 1 in Svensson [17] . He gives a very simple and short proof of the G-S Theorem for N = {1, 2}. Our proof is considerably more involved, but ultimately our main mathematical contribution is to notice that all of Svensson's arguments are robust, in the sense that they do not greatly restrict the space of preference profiles, and thus survive the transition to the quantitative version. The reader is encouraged to read Svensson's proof before reading ours.
As noted above, the deterministic notion of strategyproofness implies the deterministic notion of monotonicity. We will require a lemma that gives a quantitative version of this implication. The lemma also presents in detail the type of robustness arguments that we employ throughout the proof of the Theorem.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity).
Assume N = {1, 2}, and let f be an -strategyproof
Proof. Since f is -strategyproof, we have
We are now about to apply a critical "robustness" argument, which will be central to the proofs of both this lemma and Theorem 2. We first claim that
Indeed, this is true since any ranking Q 1 ∈ L that places f (R N ) on top is a member of I(R 1 , f(R N )), and there are (m − 1)! such rankings out of the total m! rankings. Now, from the basic laws of probability it follows that for two events E 1 and E 2 ,
and therefore
Now, from (1), (2) , and (3) we obtain:
where the first inequality follows from (3) and the second inequality follows by using both (1) and (2). By using symmetric arguments and the union bound we have that:
, and assume that strategyproofness holds "in both directions", namely the event in (5) 
2 ) with probability at most 2m . Let us extend our arguments to two steps of improvement instead of one. Analogously to (2), we have that:
Now, similarly to (4) we conclude by -strategyproofness, (6) and (3) that:
The third equality simply drops R 1 in the probability; this is possible as the event is indifferent to the choice of R 1 . Hence, we can use -strategyproofness directly on the random preference profile (Q 1 , R 2 ) and the random manipulation Q 2 by voter 2. By repeating the arguments given above for a single improvement, we get that if we choose R N and
with probability at most 2m 2 . Finally, we apply the union bound one last time to get:
The third transition follows from the fact that, given that f (R
) are one and the same. Formally,
where in the second equality above the two left hand side factors are equal since the event f (R
is independent of the choice of Q 2 . The last transition of (7) is true since the probability that
is bounded from above by the probability that
We are now in a position to prove our main theorem.
Proof (of Theorem 2). Fix two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A, and define
That is, Z(a, b) is the set of all preference profiles where voter 1 ranks a first and b second, and voter 2 ranks b first and a second. We have that
Now, for every R N ∈ Z(a, b), we have that f (R N ) ∈ {a, b} from Paretooptimality. Assume without loss of generality that at least a 1/2-fraction of the
For any
We have that
where the first equality is by the independence of the two events, and the inequality follows from (8) and (9) . At this point we appeal to -strategyproofness, and apply our recurring robustness argument, namely, in this case, (3) coupled with (10) . This gives us:
where the last inequality follows from our choice of . Therefore,
From Pareto-optimality we have that for any ( (10) and (11), we obtain:
We are now in a position to show that when a preference profile is chosen at random, the probability of obtaining a profile where voter 1 ranks a first, voter 2 ranks a last, and the winner is a is significant. Indeed,
Next, we are finally going to use Lemma 1. We have that
The first inequality follows from (3), while the second inequality is obtained by applying Lemma 1 and (12) . Therefore, there must be some R N 0 that satisfies for all x ∈ A \ {a}, aR 
Crucially, since in R N 0 voter 1 ranks a first and voter 2 ranks a last, I(R N 0 , a) is exactly the set of preference profiles such that voter 1 ranks a first. In other words, (13) can be reformulated as:
In words, voter 1 is a δ = 16m 8 -dictator with respect to a. If we had assumed that at least half the profiles in Z(a, b) satisfied f (R N ) = b, we would have deduced that voter 2 is a δ = 16m
8 -dictator with respect to b. So far, the analysis was for a fixed pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A. By repeating the analysis for every pair of alternatives, we may obtain two sets of alternatives A 1 and A 2 , such that A i contains all the alternatives for which voter i is a 16m 8 -dictator. First notice that A 3 = A \ (A 1 ∪ A 2 ) satisfies |A 3 | ≤ 1, otherwise we could perform the analysis for two alternatives in A 3 and deduce that either the first is in A 1 or the second is in A 2 .
Second, we claim that for two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A, it can't be the case that a ∈ A 1 and b ∈ A 2 . Indeed, otherwise, by the assumption that < 1/(32m 9 ), voter 1 is less than a 1/2m-dictator for a, whereas voter 2 is less than a 1/2m-dictator for b. This directly implies that: It follows that there exists a profile, where voter 1 ranks a first and voter 2 ranks b first, such that a and b are both winners, which is a contradiction to the definition of f as an SCF. Now, since |A 3 | ≤ 1 and m ≥ 3, we must have that one of A 1 or A 2 is empty (it is easily verified that otherwise there must be distinct x, y ∈ A such that x ∈ A 1 and y ∈ A 2 ). Our early assumption that at least a 1/2-fraction of the profiles in Z(a, b) satisfy f (R N ) = a ultimately led to the conclusion that a ∈ A 1 , thus it follows that A 2 = ∅.
To conclude the proof, we must show that A 3 = ∅. This is obvious, since if c ∈ A 3 , we can repeat the analysis with the pair {c, a}, and get that either c ∈ A 1 or a ∈ A 2 , which implies a contradiction. Hence, it must hold that A 1 = A, namely voter 1 is a 16m 8 -dictator.
